Former top US diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad opens up about the 'spiralling decisions' driven by anger and fear following the 9/11 attacks, admitting critical errors in the handling of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad admits post-9/11 anger led to strategic missteps in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- The US missed an early opportunity to negotiate with the Taliban in 2001.
- Faulty intelligence and the fear of another 'surprise attack' drove the invasion of Iraq.
- Khalilzad maintains that the eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan was necessary despite the chaotic execution.
Twenty-five years after the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, Zalmay Khalilzad, a former Special Representative for Afghanistan and a seasoned diplomat, has provided a candid retrospective on the United States' foreign policy trajectory. In a revealing interview with Al Jazeera's This is America, Khalilzad detailed how a national climate of fear and urgency triggered a series of geopolitical decisions that fundamentally reshaped the Middle East and Central Asia.
Khalilzad, who served on the National Security Council under President George W. Bush and later as the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations, argued that the emotional volatility of the American public played a decisive role in early military strategies. He noted that the demand for immediate action often overrode nuanced diplomatic considerations, leading to a "spiralling" effect of escalations.
The Afghanistan Miscalculation
One of the most poignant admissions made by Khalilzad concerns the early stages of the war in Afghanistan. He suggested that the US failed by refusing to engage in negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. While reports indicate the Taliban were open to a deal shortly after the invasion, the US government, fueled by anger and its position as a global superpower, opted for total military victory instead.
"One thought that has emerged is that we should have negotiated with the Taliban or included the Taliban in the political process in Afghanistan... realistically, that could have been helpful."
Why This Matters
BozokMedia analysis shows that this admission highlights a recurring flaw in US interventionist policy: the tendency to prioritize regime change over sustainable political integration. By ignoring the Taliban's early willingness to negotiate, the US entered a twenty-year war of attrition that ultimately ended with the Taliban returning to power in 2021, rendering two decades of military expenditure largely ineffective in terms of long-term governance.
The Iraq War and Intelligence Failures
Turning to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Khalilzad was blunt about the role of problematic intelligence. The justification for the war—the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—was later proven false. Khalilzad admitted that without the psychological trauma of 9/11, the US would likely never have attacked Iraq. He explained that the administration feared Saddam Hussein might facilitate another surprise attack, leading to a shift from 'containment' to 'regime change'.
| Conflict | Primary Driver | Key Mistake Identified | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | Al-Qaeda / 9/11 Response | Refusal to negotiate with Taliban | Taliban return to power (2021) |
| Iraq | WMD Fears / Pre-emption | Reliance on faulty intelligence | Overthrow of Saddam Hussein |
Despite the chaos of the 2021 withdrawal under the Biden administration, Khalilzad defended the decision to leave Afghanistan. He argued that the global security landscape had shifted and that the primary goal of decimating the immediate terrorist threat had been achieved, making an indefinite stay untenable.
Frequently Asked Questions
1. Why did the US reject early deals with the Taliban in 2001?
According to Khalilzad, the combination of intense national anger after 9/11 and the US's status as a superpower made the administration lean toward military action rather than diplomacy.
2. What was the main reason for the Iraq invasion according to the retrospective?
The invasion was driven by a fear of 'surprise attacks' and a belief that Saddam Hussein was lying about WMDs, a sentiment amplified by the vulnerability felt after the 9/11 attacks.
